Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Development aid plays a pivotal role as an economic reward and punishment mechanism between nations. An extensive literature on the allocation of aid by traditional donors exists, which emphasizes that aid is frequently given for political reasons rather than economic needs (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2005; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2009a Dreher et al. , 2009b Kilby 2011) . With the ongoing redistribution of world power, so-called new donor countries appear and might (ab)use development aid to push through their interests.
Only recently have scholars started analyzing the allocation of aid from these so-called emerging donors with quantitative methods (see Neumayer 2003a Neumayer , 2004 Dreher et al. 2011 ).
According to the results in Dreher et al. (2011) , 'new' donors attach less importance to recipient need than Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors when allocating aid.
However, concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overstated for new and old donors alike. Arguably, these findings might be driven by the omission of the major 'new' donor, China. 1 China is often described as the chief villain among the 'new' donors. Naím (2007) characterizes its development aid as 'rogue aid' as it is not guided by need in the developing countries, but rather by China's national interests. The determinants of Chinese development assistance are, according to Naím, access to resources and boosting international alliances.
Moreover, 'rogue donors' are said to undermine the development efforts of Western donors to promote good governance in the developing world. However, this verdict is based on selective case studies only. No empirical study exists confronting the various claims about Chinese 'rogue aid' with data. This is because comprehensive data on the allocation of China's development aid are difficult to obtain. 2 In this paper, we make use of various datasets on the allocation of Chinese foreign aid.
First, we use data on the number of aid projects completed. Data are obtained from Bartke . Second, we use data on the estimated amount of Chinese foreign aid (in US$) that has been provided to recipient countries until the mid-1980s. Data are collected from 3 various intelligence reports of the CIA (1975 CIA ( -1984 , from an OECD study (1987) and again from Bartke (1989) . Third, we make use of data on the number of medical teams that have been dispatched, also collected from the China Commerce Yearbook. Finally, we employ a dataset on food aid (World Food Programme 2011) To foreshadow our results, we find that political considerations are an important determinant of China's allocation of aid. However, when we compare its allocation to those of other donors, China does not pay significantly more attention to politics. We find only mixed evidence that commercial motives determine China's aid allocation decisions. Neither democracy nor governance play an important role. Overall, denominating aid from China as 'rogue aid' thus seems unjustified.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data on China's allocation of aid, while outlining our hypotheses regarding the determinants of China's aid allocation in Section 3. The method of estimation and our main econometric results are presented in 5 Nevertheless, we are able to make use of several data sources that provide information on four variables that capture the lion's share of China's foreign aid activities since the foundation of its aid program in the 1950s and that by and large qualify as ODA. 7 First, we use data on the number of aid projects completed from Bartke (1989) and from the China Commerce Yearbook (Ministry of Commerce 1984 Commerce -2009 . Bartke (1989) collected 2,500 news items on China's economic aid between 1956 and 1987. 8 Most of them were collected from the Chinese press, with less than 10% originating from secondary sources (mainly from the recipient countries). 528 completed aid projects in 69 developing countries (plus Kuwait and Malta) are recorded in the dataset. The first completed aid project registered in the database was the construction of a textile mill in Thamaing (Burma) in 1956. The single most outstanding project was the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway line. Bartke (1989) stresses that only small projects may be missing in the dataset, which presumably was the case if China felt that they were not sufficiently important to be published.
Data on completed aid projects for more recent years are obtained from China's
Ministry of Commerce (1984 Commerce ( -2009 , which provides this information in the China Commerce
Yearbook and its predecessors. This information on aid projects completed during the 1990-2005 period was compiled in a comprehensive dataset by Hawkins et al. (2010) and is publicly available. The first completed aid project recorded in the dataset was the construction of a sporting complex in Jordan in 1990, and the last one was the provision of teaching appliances, medical apparatus and agricultural machines to Colombia in 2005. Altogether, the dataset consists of 304 aid projects provided to 97 developing countries (and Malta).
At first, it may seem as a drawback that these data only cover aid projects run by the
Ministry of Commerce and exclude those administered by the Exim Bank and the China
Development Bank (as well as technical assistance). However, loans from the China Development Bank are not concessional in nature and therefore do not qualify as ODA.
Although the Exim Bank partly provides concessional loans, it is contestable whether these flows should be considered as ODA. According to Brautigam (2011: 761) Second, we study China's allocation of aid amounts in US$. Data are collected from various intelligence reports of the CIA (1975 CIA ( -1984 , from a study of the OECD (1987) , and from Bartke (1989) . The estimates of China's total aid to recipient countries retrieved from Bartke and 1987 have been provided to Africa, highlighting China's aspirations to become the leading power in the Third World (Bartke 1989) . 22.7% of China's economic aid in this period were provided to Asia, with the intention of creating "friendly relations with its closest neighbours" (Bartke 1989: 10) .
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The second dataset on aid amounts (US$) has been established based on several intelligence reports from the CIA (1975 CIA ( -1984 . This series of handbooks served as the intelligence community's official database on foreign aid activities of communist countries.
Data are taken from the most recent report, with missing years being completed using older Based on these four aid indicators, Figure 6 provides an overview of the evolution of China's aid program over time. As can be seen, the number of aid projects follows a positive trend, but volatility is high. Aid amounts peaked in the early 1970s and fluctuated in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s at around US$600 million (constant year 2000) according to the taking food in metric tons to assure comparability between different types of food aid. Data are available on http://www.wfp.org/fais. Economic considerations became more influential in China's aid allocation decisions. The scale of individual projects was reduced, but mutually advantageous programs were promoted (OECD 1987) . While Chinese aid was provided as interest-free long-term loans or grants in the beginning, conditions became stricter, but were still very favorable in the 1980s: The grant element of Chinese aid fluctuated between 60 and 75 percent over the 1980 -1985 period (OECD 1987 . Another new focus of China's foreign aid in the 1980s was the emphasis on the upgrading and maintenance of existing projects.
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The fourth phase (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) started after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.
China sought actively for diplomatic support and increased its aid substantially, in particular to African countries (Taylor 1998; Brautigam 2008 Brautigam , 2010 . As pointed out by Taylor (1998), African reactions to the massacre were substantially softer compared to Western reactions, and sometimes even supportive. According to Taylor (1998: 450) , "[s]uch a[n aid] policy was a quick and comparatively cheap way by which Beijing could reward those countries that had stood by China during the 1989 crisis as well as cementing relations for the future."
At the same time, planners "were well aware that resource scarcities, particularly in domestic energy, would soon become an issue for domestic production, and they moved to position the country to overcome that challenge" (Brautigam 2008: 11) . The importance of economic considerations is said to have become more and more predominant in China's aid strategy (Davies 2007; Pehnelt 2007) . In particular, the aid reform of 1995 introduced marketoriented principles and emphasized the linkages between aid, trade and investment (Brautigam 2010) . This reform, after which "China's aid activities have entered a completely different phase compared to the previous periods" (Kobayashi 2008: 7) , is taken as the starting point for the fifth phase (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . The central aim of the reform was to multiply the ways in which foreign financing is supplied to developing countries. In addition to grants and interest-free loans as a flexible and quick form of financing, China offered interestsubsidized preferential loans as well as joint ventures and cooperations of complete projects. 
Hypotheses
Chinese aid is not linked to conditions typically imposed by Western donors such as good policies, democracy or respect for human rights. Furthermore, Chinese financial assistance is quickly made available (e.g., Davies 2007) . 19 China is thus a welcome alternative to DAC donors with their bureaucratic procedures and detailed policy conditionality. At the same time, development aid from China is criticized as being driven by domestic economic and political interests to a higher extent than development aid from traditional DAC donors.
Motives for the allocation of aid can be broadly grouped into three categories; first, aid should depend on need; second, the quality of policies and institutions might matter; and third, the donor's commercial or political self-interests have been shown to play a role (e.g., Alesina
and Dollar 2000). We discuss these motives in turn.
With respect to poverty and development, the Ministry of Commerce (1985: 413) emphasizes that its aid projects play "a positive role in expanding the national economies of the recipient countries and improving the material and cultural life of the people in these countries." Emphasizing the idea of 'mutual benefit', the ministry claims "to help the recipient countries develop their national economies and bring about economic progress for Halper (2010: 100) cites president Museveni of Uganda: "The Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions, and they make other people's business their business, while the Chinese just deal with you as one who represents your country, and for them they represent their own interests and you just do business." Tull (2006: 466-467 ) quotes a spokesman of the Kenyan government as follows: "You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to tackle corruption." 22 See also Alesina and Weder (2002) . Similarly, Neumayer (2003b) find no consistent evidence that DAC donors reward recipients with a good human rights record.15 democratization in Africa as it could use failed African democratizations as an argument against demands for its own democratization.
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Turning to self-interest, facilitating the export of natural resources to China is seen as a central aim of Chinese aid. China's "insatiable needs" for resources (oil, minerals, and timber in particular) are mentioned most frequently as commercial motives of its aid (e.g., In addition to resource security, Chinese aid is accused of targeting future access to export markets and profitable investments (Davies 2007; Lum et al. 2009 ). Medical aid, for example, is considered as a tool to improve the reputation of Chinese medicine and as "a clever and low cost way to introduce Chinese-made medications to the African market" that Chinese aid is given in kind rather than cash, it might also be less prone to corruption. China clearly tries to tackle corruption where repayment of its loans is at risk (Brautigam 2008) . 24 According to Deng Xiaoping, "talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries [who] practice power politics" (as quoted in Taylor, 1998: 453) .
The literature has given special attention to the political motivation of Chinese aid allocation to Africa. 25 As Davies (2007: 27) Given that our data vary over time, we can evaluate whether, and to what extent, the Chinese aid allocation shows (the expected) different patterns over the five phases outlined above. In summary, we expect the first phase (1956-69) to be dominated by political and ideological considerations. The second phase (1970-78) should equally be dominated by political motives, while economic motives should become more relevant in the third phase . In search for support after the Tiananmen Square massacre, political clout should dominate again in the fourth phase , while commercial and more market-liberal considerations should be important for China's allocation of aid in the fifth phase (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . In all phases, we expect the non-interference principle to be reflected in China neglecting recipient countries' quality of policies and governance. We expect the allocation of Chinese aid to be driven by resource considerations. However, we also expect its aid to take account, at least to some degree, of poverty and need in the recipient countries.
25 While most researchers focus on Africa, there is less work on China's aid to Asia. A notable exception is Schüller et al. (2010) , who exploit detailed data on China's engagement in Cambodia, among others. 26 Taiwan also uses aid to reward countries for recognizing it as independent country, sparking "something of a bidding war" (Brautigam 2008: 11) . Its dollar diplomacy has been successful in maintaining its international profile (Taylor 1998) . See also Rich (2009) for the connection between foreign aid and diplomatic recognition of the two Chinas. 27 According to Taylor (1998: 451) , China is "[a]lways mindful of the fact that the West is in a minority in international organisations such as the United Nations, the courting of support from developing nations enabled China to successfully resist Western 'hegemonism' at a time when the old bi-polar world was crumbling."
Econometric analysis of China's aid allocation

Empirical strategy and data
To test our hypotheses, we look at the four types of aid indicators explained above and estimate the share each developing country receives of total Chinese aid allocated in a particular phase of China's aid program. 28 More specifically, we analyze (1) the number of aid projects compiled from Bartke (1989) and the Ministry of Commerce (1984 Commerce ( -2009 , (2a) aid amounts in US$ from Bartke (1989) , (2b) We estimate our models by employing five cross-sections rather than time-series cross-sectional data. Each cross-section corresponds to one of the five phases of China's aid program outlined in the previous section. The reason for estimating cross-sections rather than a panel with yearly data is that China's aid flows are rather volatile from one year to the next (see again Figure 6 ). The variables that we employ below, however, can hardly be assumed to explain this volatility. Rather, we expect them to be able to explain the average share of total aid that a particular country receives from China in certain years (see also Gupta et al. 2006) .
Given that we are interested in the differential effects of the explanatory variables over time, we do not pool the cross-sections either, but allow the coefficients of all variables to be different in each cross-section. This choice is supported by a test for equality in coefficients, at the one percent level of significance. The test thus clearly indicates that pooling would not be appropriate. 31 For each aid indicator, we thus estimate the following equation:
We use the share in the overall aid budget to be able to compare marginal effects over time, even when the average size of China's aid projects changes over time and when focusing on periods that cover a different number of years. We restrict our analysis to recipient countries that are on the DAC List of ODA Recipients as of January 1, 2006 (available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/34/37954893.pdf, accessed February 14, 2011). 29 We include all three measures of aid amounts in US$ since we have no a priori belief which data source is best suited. The correlation between the three measures is 75.4% (Bartke-CIA), 77.1% (Bartke-OECD) and 80.3% (CIA-OECD), respectively. 30 Zero aid shares are prevalent in our data -in particular in earlier years (see Appendix D). 31 For this test, we used our baseline specification in column 1 of Table 1. where ℎ is the share of China's total aid that country receives in phase of China's aid program; x it is a vector containing a set of explanatory variables (including a constant) interacted with a set of period dummies; is a vector of unknown period-specific parameters; and is stochastic term with unit conditional mean.
In line with the previous literature on aid allocation, we include a set of possible determinants as explanatory variables (e.g., Dreher et al. 2011) . Note that all these variables are averaged over the respective time period under consideration. Assuming that 'new' donors such as China are more likely to give aid to countries that are geographically closer to them, we account for the (logged) distance between the recipient and the donor country.
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We control for (logged) population of recipient countries in order to control for the size of a recipient country. Larger countries need more resources to develop. Given that our dependent variable is not in per-capita terms, we expect aid to rise with population. The logged per-capita GDP is a commonly used indicator of recipient need, which has repeatedly been shown to shape the distribution of aid. In line with China's official objectives quoted above, we expect the effects of per-capita GDP to be significantly negative in our regressions.
As a further proxy for recipient need, we use the (logged) total number of people affected by a natural disaster in the recipient country.
Our primary measure for merit is a dummy for democracy coded as 1 if multiple parties are legally allowed and exist outside the regime front, as well as if the selection of the executive and the legislature involve an either direct or indirect mandate from an electorate (Cheibub et al. 2010) . Moreover, in order to qualify as a democracy, incumbents must not be able to unconstitutionally close the lower house of the legislature and rewrite the rules in their favor. Following China's non-interference principle, we expect this variable to be insignificant.
To proxy donors' political self-interests, the literature suggests a recipient country's voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 20 be in good shape at the moment when the aid money was disbursed or an aid project was completed. This is of particular importance as China's aid has been suspended in many cases after a deterioration of diplomatic relations with recipients (see Bartke 1989 for a discussion).
Beyond that, the question of timing is not central to our research, which aims to examine whether and to which extent political and commercial interests matter for China's aid allocation rather than whether aid is used to bribe or reward the countries.
China's project aid
The results are shown in Table 1 . We run nested regressions for all periods, rather than performing regressions for each phase and comparing the individual results. Pooling the phases enables us to statistically test for differences and similarities among them. Note however, that we introduce dummies for each individual phase; we interact these dummies with our explanatory variables, mirroring individual regressions for the individual phases. Table 1 indicate that all six models pass the RESET test at the five percent level of significance.
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In column 1, we focus on the share of aid projects, based on 528 observations. As can be seen here, the share of projects a country receives is not related to its distance from China, at conventional levels of significance. The exception is the fourth phase , where the share of projects increases with distance. However, the effect is only significant at the ten percent level. With respect to the fifth phase, distance matters more in the fourth, also at the ten percent level. Overall, there is no evidence that China gives more aid to countries that are geographically closer, which is contrary to the results in Dreher et al. (2011) for non-DAC donors (excluding China). China, having global ambitions, seems to behave differently than the other (smaller) emerging donors.
37 Note that comparisons of the first three phases with phase 5 need to be interpreted with caution as we draw data from two different data sources. 38 At the ten percent level, the estimation based on aid data from the CIA does not pass the test, while the other regressions do. Notes : -Es ti ma ti on techni que: Poi s s on Ps eudo Ma ximum Likel i hood (PPML) wi th s ta nda rd errors cl us tere d by reci pient country -All regres s ions i nclude time peri od dummi es a nd a l l expla na tory va ria bles a re i ntera cted wi th the s e dummi es -We report ma rgi na l effects of the expla na tory va ria bles (corres pondi ng z-va lues in pa renthes es ) -In bracke ts : p-va lue s of a Wa ld te st of equa l ma rgina l effects of the res pective period compa red to the l a s t peri od on whi ch da ta a re a va i la ble -* (**, ***) i ndi ca te s s i gnifi ca nce a t the ten (fi ve , one) percent le vel -Da ta s ets do not neces s a ril y cover a l l yea rs of the res pective pha s e of China 's a id progra m (s ee Secti on 2 a nd Appendi x A)
Regarding population size, we find no significant effects on the share of aid projects a country receives in the first three phases. Only since the 1990s do we find that larger countries receive fewer projects, at the ten percent level between 1990-1995 (phase 4), and at the one percent level in the 1996-2005 period (phase 5). Given that our dependent variable is not in per-capita terms, this result is surprising. Compared to the fifth period, we find that population was significantly less important for China's decision to grant aid in the second and third period, at the one percent level of significance.
Turning to per-capita income, we find that recipient need is important for China's allocation of aid. Specifically, a country's share of aid projects decreases with per-capita GDP, the effect being statistically significant at conventional levels in phases 2 [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . 42 The quantitative impact of voting is sizeable. In the 1956-1969 period a country changing its voting behavior from zero to one (i.e., from always voting with Taiwan to never) receives an aid share that is 5.2 percentage points higher. The impact increases to 7.4 in the second period, but decreases thereafter. In phases 2-4, the impact of voting was significantly more important compared to the fifth phase, at least at the five percent level.
There is thus strong evidence that Chinese aid supports its allies, in line with Naím (2007).
While we do not find empirical support for the idea that political considerations became more important in the period after the Tiananmen incident, our results confirm our expectations that voting with the UNGA is of less importance in the fifth phase. Taking the results for both political variables together, our empirical evidence suggests that political factors have been important drivers of China's aid allocation decisions across all phases of its aid program.
Finally, we look at whether or not commercial motives are important for China's aid allocation. The results are mixed here. We find a significant impact of a recipient country's exports to China only in two of the five phases. However, these are the two periods, in which we expected commercial interests to be predominant. Specifically, a recipient country's aid share increases with its bilateral exports in the 1979-1987 period (phase 3), the period of Deng Xioping's "Reform and Opening Up," and the 1996-2005 period (phase 5), the period after the aid reform of 1995 that emphasized the linkages between aid, trade and investment.
In quantitative terms, an increase in exports by 10 percent increases a country's share in 41 When we exclude the other variable for political motives, UNGA voting alignment, from the regression, the effect of the recognition of Taiwan becomes statistically significant from the second phase (results available upon request). 42 Note that the effect of UNGA voting alignment becomes statistically significant at the five percent level in the fifth phase when we drop the Taiwan recognition variable from our regression (results available on request).
China's aid projects by 0.011 percentage points in phase 3 (0.111*log(1.1)) and 0.015 percentage points in phase 5. 43 Nevertheless, given the perceptions about China granting aid for predominantly commercial reasons, this is a surprisingly low effect. This impression is strengthened by looking at the results for oil production. In only one phase do we observe a significant effect (phase 3). However, the marginal effect is negative rather than positive (at the five percent level). The expectation that China is a resource-hungry donor, granting money mainly to oil-rich countries for the sake of securing its resource needs, is therefore not supported. 
Total aid money, medical teams and food aid
Columns 2-6 replicate the analysis employing our alternative dependent variables. The results are in line with those of column 1 to some extent. With respect to the share of the aid amount a country receives, distance hardly seems to matter. Using the data obtained from Bartke (column 2) and the CIA (column 3), we find that more distant countries received significantly less aid in the first phase, but not thereafter. This seems to reflect that China was a small donor in its early years, thus focusing on its neighbors, as is the case for many new donors in recent years (Dreher et al. 2011) . Using the OECD data (column 4), the coefficients are not significant at conventional levels for the two phases these data are available. The same holds for food aid (column 6). The exception is medical teams. As can be seen in column 5, more teams go to countries that are further away. Population is not significant at conventional levels in most regressions, with two exceptions where the coefficient is again negative.
Regarding the need orientation of China's total aid amount, we find that more aid money goes to poorer countries in only one of the specifications (phase 2, column 2). While the other marginal effects are all negative (as expected), they are not significant at conventional levels. Moreover, fewer medical teams are sent to richer countries (statistically significant at conventional levels in the third and fourth phase -see column 5), and richer countries also receive less food aid (significant in the fifth phase -column 6). According to columns 2-4, countries hit by more disasters receive larger aid amounts in the second phase, at the one percent level of significance. However, disasters do not seem to matter for the 43 When replacing bilateral exports by bilateral trade, i.e., exports plus imports, the marginal effects in these two phases are again positive, and even significant at the one percent level. However, bilateral imports to China alone do not turn out to be statistically significant in any of the five phases of China's aid program (results available upon request). 44 We test for the robustness of these results by substituting the oil production variable with 15 alternative measures of natural resources in Section 5.
allocation of medical teams and food aid, both being aid types that are expected to be particularly responsive to these catastrophes.
The results for democracy are similar to those reported for column 1 above. In phase 3, more democratic countries receive less money, with marginal effects being significant at the ten percent level or slightly below. Similarly, fewer medical teams are dispatched to democracies than to autocracies in the 1990-1995 period (phase 4).
Turning to political motives, both the recognition of Taiwan and UNGA voting are again important determinants of China's allocation of aid. In all phases of China's aid program, there is strong evidence that politics play an important role in the allocation of aid money and medical teams to recipient countries. Only the allocation of food aid does not appear to be shaped by political motivations. With respect to commercial interests, we again find only weak evidence that they drive aid allocation decisions. In particular, there is no evidence that the allocation of aid amounts, medical teams and food aid is used as a tool for export promotion. All of these respective effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels. With the exception of medical teams dispatched, we find no evidence that China's aid allocation is guided by natural resource endowments. An increase of a recipient's oil production by 10% is found to increase this country's share in receiving China's medical teams by 0.007 in the third phase and by 0.010 in the fourth phase, the marginal effects being statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
In summary, we did not find much evidence that China ignores recipient need as claimed by its critics when deciding on its aid allocation. Nor did we find strong evidence that commercial interests matter or that recipient countries with bad governance are favored. 45 However, we did find that politics are important in all five phases of China's aid program.
While some of the more extreme concerns regarding China's allocation of aid seem to be exaggerated ('rogue aid'), to some extent, China's critics might be right. To the extent that other donors reward democratic countries with more aid, the availability of aid from China could undermine the effectiveness of other countries' aid. Even if recipient need is important for Chinese aid allocation, it could well be that the elasticity of aid to income is substantially lower compared to those of other countries. On the contrary, while we found that politics are important, it might well be that aid from other countries reacts even more to political considerations, in line with evidence reported by Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Kuziemko and Werker (2006) . In order to assess these questions, we need to compare the allocation of China's aid with those of other donors. This is what we turn to next.
Comparison with DAC and other emerging donors
In order to study whether China's aid is really different, Tables 2-4 Unfortunately, no direct information on the annual number of aid projects completed is available for the benchmark countries. Therefore, we construct such a variable in three different ways, using data from the project-level aid database AidData. 47 First, we use information on the projected completion date at the time of the commitment of each aid project to derive the year of completion. Second, we estimate the year of completion by taking the mean duration of all projects of a particular country as this entry is missing for earlier years for some countries. Third, since the entry of the year of completion is entirely missing for some countries, we estimate the year of completion for these countries by taking the average of the estimated mean duration of all countries. Since the correlation of the resulting three variables is very high for those countries for which we can construct all three measures, we take the coarsest proxy variable that is based on the single estimated average project duration for all countries and is hence available for all donor countries. 48 Finally, in order to increase the comparability of our variable with the Chinese data, we restrict the 46 Given that the amounts of China's aid are not directly comparable to Western aid, as outlined above, the focus on the number of projects is preferable. This comes at the disadvantage that projects of different size are treated the same. Focusing on the number or existence of projects rather than or in addition to investigating amounts of aid is standard in the aid allocation literature (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009a, b We again run nested regressions. So that we can test for differences in the effects of the individual variables on the different donors, we include all donors rather than performing regressions for each individual donor and comparing the individual results. In Table 2 , we use the same explanatory variables as in Table 1 above. The RESET test statistic is not statistically significant at conventional levels, i.e., there is no evidence that our model is misspecified. As can be seen, distance matters for all countries except China and the United
States. However, while the EU-3 and the 'good donors' give a larger share of their aid projects to more distant countries, Japan, Korea and the Arab donors focus instead on countries that are less distant. This is in line with the observation that 'new' donors focus on their own region (e.g., Dreher et al. 2011) . The obvious exception to this rule is China, and the differences in coefficients are significant at the ten percent level at least, for all 'new' donors (again indicated by the Wald tests in brackets). 49 The sectors included are the following (DAC purpose codes in parentheses): Agriculture, forestry, fishing (311, 312, 313), communications (220), education (111, 112, 113, 114) , energy (230) 
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With respect to population, the United States, the EU-3, and the 'good donors' give a larger share of their projects to more populous countries, as expected. Regarding recipient income, this same group of countries gives more aid to poorer countries, at the five percent level of significance, while GDP per capita has no significant impact on the aid allocation of Japan, Korea and the Arab donors. Surprisingly however, the marginal effect of (log) percapita GDP in the regression for China exceeds those of the other donors by a factor of at least 3. These differences are significant at the one percent level throughout. Consequently, rather than ignoring recipient need in its allocation of aid, China shows the strongest concern for recipient income among the sample of donors we investigate, with a marginal effect even larger than that for the 'good donors'. However, these positive results with respect to recipient need are mitigated through the fact that China's aid shares do not react to population size.
The results also show that few donors allocate significantly larger aid shares to countries hit by disasters. This holds for the EU-3 and Japan at the five percent level.
Surprisingly (also at the five percent level), Arab donors allocate fewer projects to countries that experienced catastrophes. Compared to China, the only significant difference holds with respect to these Arab donors, with China allocating more aid to countries hit by disasters, at the one percent level of significance. Again, there is no evidence that China's allocation of aid is inferior from a humanitarian point of view compared to other donor countries.
With regard to democracy, only one of the marginal effects turns out to be significant at conventional levels. Surprisingly, the 'good donors' allocate significantly smaller shares of their aid projects to democracies. However, the difference to China is not significant at conventional levels, as is true for the difference between China and any of the other donors included here. Columns 1-8 of Table 3 show that China clearly does not take account of institutional quality when deciding on its allocation of aid. In none of the regressions does the coefficient of any of the governance variables turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Comparing the aid allocation of China with that of the other donors, the 'good donors' allocate significantly more aid to more effective and less corrupt countries, and less aid to military dictatorships. 51 We also did not use the rule of law as it is highly correlated with the control of corruption and government effectiveness.
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Significant differences also emerge with respect to the EU-3 (2 variables), the United States (3 variables), and Japan (4 variables) -in all cases favoring recipients with good institutions.
Therefore, overall it seems the fears that Chinese aid would undermine the efforts of other donors to promote democracy and good governance are exaggerated. Interestingly, Korea favors countries that score worse on the voice and accountability and control of corruption indices.
Regarding politics, the results in Table 2 show that the United States and Japan reward countries voting in line with them in the United Nations General Assembly. The importance of political considerations for these donors is in line with previous research (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Kilby 2011). We also find that Arab donors allocate a larger share of their aid projects to countries voting with them in the General Assembly, and surprisingly, the same holds for the average 'good donor'. The Arab donors are, according to the UNGA voting measure, the only donors that put significantly more weight on political motives than China does. 52 At the one percent level of significance, Japan and the Arab donors give less aid to countries recognizing Taiwan. It seems that Japan, as China's main regional competitor, supports countries opposing China. Note however, that the quantitative effect of recognition is substantially larger in absolute terms for China than for the Arab donors and Japan.
It is well known that donors' commercial interests affect their allocation of aid. This is clearly confirmed in Table 2 . The share in the donor's aid portfolio a country receives increases significantly with exports for most of the donors covered here. At the one percent level, this holds for the United States, the EU-3, the 'good donors' and Japan. Exports do not enter significantly into the regressions for Korea and the Arab donors. Interestingly, exports are not significantly more important for the allocation of Chinese aid compared to any of the other donors (with the exception of the Arab donors). Similarly, China does not place significantly more emphasis on oil production than its peers, as can be seen in the final column of Table 2 .
The oil production variable has been chosen primarily for its good data coverage, but it does arguably not capture all facets of a country's endowment with natural resources. In Table 4 , oil production (column 1) is replaced by fifteen alternative measures of natural resource endowment; introduced one at the time. We start by varying the data source of the oil production variable (column 2), replace the oil amount by a dummy variable simply indicating whether a country produces oil or not (column 3), and use oil reserves instead of production to better account for the future availability of oil (column 4). Rather than just focusing on oil, we also employ variables capturing the production of gas, coal, and diamonds (columns 5-7) and the unit resource rents and quantities of energy and minerals extracted (columns 8-9) to display a wider range of natural resources. As a next step, we account for total and bilateral trade with fuel, ore, and agricultural raw materials (columns 10-15).
Finally, we use a measure of a country's natural capital as calculated by the World Bank (2010), which is defined as the sum of crop, pasture land, timber, non-timber forest, protected areas, oil, natural gas, coal, and minerals (column 16). Appendix A provides an overview of the sources and definitions of these variables.
As illustrated in Table 4 , other than one exception (bilateral imports of agricultural raw materials, column 15), there is no evidence that China provides, on average, significantly more aid to countries that are more abundant in natural resources, and the same holds for most other donor countries. With a few exceptions, there is also no evidence that China's aid reacts more to natural resources compared to other donors. Compared to Korea, it even seems that China pays less attention to these resources. Holding all other variables constant, the respective tests of equal coefficients indicate that Korea's aid program is more targeted to important producers of oil, gas and coal than is the case for China (columns 2 and 4-6). Again it seems that objections against aid from China are overstated.
Summary and conclusions
China is said to be the chief villain among the so-called new donors. It has been claimed that it strategically allocates its aid in order to get easy access to natural resources and to bribe countries to get their support in international politics. It is often said that it neglects the recipient countries' institutional quality, thus undermining other donors' efforts to promote the worldwide spread of democracy and the rule of law. China's development aid has even been characterized as 'rogue aid' (Naím 2007) . In this paper, we confronted these claims with data. We collected information on the number of Chinese aid projects completed over the 1956-2005 period, the amount of aid money , the number of medical teams sent (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , and food aid delivered (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) .
Using these data, we tested whether, and to what extent, Chinese aid was motivated by developmental, governance-related, political, or commercial motives over five phases of China's aid program. In the first phase (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) , we expected China's aid to be mainly driven by political and ideological considerations. In the second phase (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) With the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, we expected economic considerations to become more influential in China's aid allocation decisions in the third phase (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . Political considerations were expected to dominate again in the fourth phase (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , which started after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, where China sought actively for diplomatic support and increased its aid substantially. In the fifth phase (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , we expected market-oriented principles and the linkages between aid, trade and investment to become more important.
Our empirical results are only partly in line with these expectations. Indeed, commercial motives seem to be more relevant for China's allocation of aid in the third and fifth phases. We find that politics are important in all five phases of China's aid program.
Countries that vote in line with China in the United Nations General Assembly and do not recognize Taiwan as independent country receive larger aid shares. The results show some evidence that China follows recipient need when deciding on its aid allocation as it favors countries with low per-capita income. Finally, China's aid is for most of the time independent of the recipients' institutional characteristics, which seems to confirm the non-interference principle.
To put these results in perspective, we compared China's aid allocation decisions in the 1996-2005 period with those of traditional DAC donor countries and other emerging donors. There is no evidence that China's allocation of aid is inferior from a humanitarian point of view when compared to other donor countries. When it comes to democracy and indicators of governance, there is also little evidence that China's allocation of aid is inferior.
We found that China does not take account of institutional quality when deciding on its allocation of aid. However, the same holds for most other donors in our sample. In particular,
we did not find that China's aid is biased towards autocratic or corrupt regimes as claimed by its critics. Based on China's aid allocation decisions, it seems that fears that Chinese aid undermines the efforts of other donors to promote democracy and good governance are exaggerated. The same holds for commercial motives. While commercial interests matter, our empirical evidence does not support the idea that China puts greater weight on giving aid to neither countries with strong commercial ties, nor to countries that are more abundant in natural resources, in comparison to other donors.
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Our empirical findings confirm that China's aid allocation decisions are shaped by politics. However, compared to the DAC and other emerging donors, the fact that political self-interest is part of China's aid motives is not exceptional. While both China and DAC donors use aid for strategic reasons, China communicates more openly that its aid serves mutual benefit. We find that China's aid is independent of institutional characteristics, which confirms the non-interference principle. Overall, the verdict that China's foreign aid is 'rogue aid' seems wide of the mark.
A potential drawback of our study is the omission of aid provided by the China Exim
Bank. However, since our study covers aid allocated by the Ministry of Commerce, it is unlikely that this omission biases our results against finding a significant impact of commercial motives. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the concessional loans provided by the bank qualify as ODA. The omission could only be overcome if China were willing to publish detailed statistics on its development aid and other official flows. According to our results, greater transparency would be in China's own interest. Comparing our results with anecdotal evidence prevalent in the media, it seems that China has little reason to be intransparent. Transparency might reduce fears about China's aid program.
Other donors seem to see China mainly as competitor (Brautigam 2008) and this contributes to its negative image. They favor their own models of development. However, there is little evidence that the traditional development model works better. As pointed out by Brautigam (2008) , the close relationship between Japan as a donor and China as recipient, might serve as role model for China's aid in Africa. China still is a recipient of substantial development aid and has a lot in common with many recipients of its own aid. Therefore, Chinese aid might be more effective than that of the DAC donors, and developing countries might be more willing to listen to its advice (Davies 2007) . That being said, the effectiveness of aid depends on factors other than the motives for its allocation. Different modes of delivery as well as project design and supervision might make Chinese aid more or less effective compared to aid of other donors. We leave this important question for future research. 
